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GCP security architecture · an engineering notebook

From source code to trusted execution

A build creates an artifact. This system decides who may publish it, which release to select, and whether it may run. Follow the decisions, inspect the recorded evidence, and see what still needs observation after admission.

One artifact · several authoritiesdigest D
Source, claims, manual selection, admission and runtimeSource enters CI. CI publishes image digest D and signed claims. A reviewer manually pins D in Git. Argo requests D. Kyverno allows matching trusted requests or denies mismatches. Falco observes execution after admission.Source & guarded CIImage D + signed claimsReviewer pins D → ArgoKyverno admission decisionbuild / publish / endorsesignature · SBOM · provenancemanual Git selectionmatching trust allows · mismatch deniesFalco observes execution after admission
  1. Source & guarded CIBuild, publish and endorse digest D.
  2. Image D + signed claimsSignature, SPDX SBOM and provenance.
  3. Reviewer pins D → ArgoA manual Git selection produces desired state.
  4. Kyverno decides admissionMatching trust allows; missing or mismatched claims deny.
  5. Falco observes executionDetection happens after admission.
Illustrative digest D. A signature authenticates an endorsement; runtime detection observes behavior.

Publishing, endorsing, selecting and admitting an image are different responsibilities. Follow the nine handoffs to identify the input, output and responsible actor at each step. A successful build supplies a candidate artifact; the release and execution decisions still have to happen.

Nine decisions · inspect the responsible actor and handoff

01 / Review a change

Can this change safely enter the trusted build path?

Input: PR revision. Output: Checks without publish authority. Verifier: PR checks.

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02 / Authenticate to GCP

Who may publish or read registry content?

Input: GitHub OIDC token. Output: Registry authority. Verifier: GCP IAM.

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03 / Build exact content

Which artifact did the release checks evaluate?

Input: Trusted main revision. Output: Image digest. Verifier: Trivy.

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04 / Sign the digest

Which workflow endorsed these exact bytes?

Input: Digest and workflow identity. Output: Signature. Verifier: Cosign.

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05 / Attach statements

What claims accompany the artifact?

Input: Image and build context. Output: SBOM and provenance. Verifier: Cosign.

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06 / Verify release claims

Do these statements match this build and source revision?

Input: Digest and statements. Output: Release verification. Verifier: Cosign and jq.

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07 / Select a release

Which verified digest is permitted to run?

Input: Verified digest. Output: Reviewed Git digest pin. Verifier: Reviewer and Argo CD.

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08 / Decide admission

Does the requested image meet this namespace and registry policy?

Input: Requested Pod image. Output: Allow or deny. Verifier: Kyverno.

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09 / Observe runtime

What does an admitted process do next?

Input: Running process events. Output: Detection. Verifier: Falco.

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I hardened the verification contract, integrated the admission reader identity, and selected the immutable release digest in Git. These three cases connect the code changes to the evidence and expose their remaining limits. The full engineering account also covers canonical identity and PR validation.

Inspect all five engineering changes →

Recorded acceptance

A trusted digest enters the workload

The historical capture records the configured digest-pinned workload and a matching trusted request. It establishes this tested path in its recorded environment.

Inspect the accepted request →
Recorded rejection

An unsigned image meets a boundary

A matching unsigned request is rejected. Unmatched registries, excluded namespaces and untested subresources remain separate questions.

Inspect the policy scope →

Understand the connected system, review the claims against evidence, or prepare an owned reproduction. Each path reuses the detailed handbook instead of replacing it with a simplified overview.

Browse the evidence catalogue and all fourteen original screenshots. The captions distinguish code inspection, local checks and recorded execution. A valid signature authenticates an endorsement; it does not establish safe behavior or current cluster health.

Satyam Agnihotri

DevOps & Cloud Engineer · devSatym

I focus on Kubernetes, cloud infrastructure, and secure delivery workflows. My documentation explains how systems work together, why decisions were made, and what the evidence demonstrates.

Explore my engineering work

More engineering projects

Explore related public implementation work. Each project has its own scope and evidence.

Public implementation

Resilience Gate

Public implementation of Resilience Gate. Inspect its source independently; the GCP captures in this handbook do not validate that project.

Resilience Gate source repository