Make release verification assert the contract
I replaced display-oriented checks with exact signer, digest and parsed provenance assertions that fail when the expected contract is absent.
Read the change and evidenceGCP security architecture · an engineering notebook
A build creates an artifact. This system decides who may publish it, which release to select, and whether it may run. Follow the decisions, inspect the recorded evidence, and see what still needs observation after admission.
Publishing, endorsing, selecting and admitting an image are different responsibilities. Follow the nine handoffs to identify the input, output and responsible actor at each step. A successful build supplies a candidate artifact; the release and execution decisions still have to happen.
Nine decisions · inspect the responsible actor and handoff
Can this change safely enter the trusted build path?
Input: PR revision. Output: Checks without publish authority. Verifier: PR checks.
Read this stage →Who may publish or read registry content?
Input: GitHub OIDC token. Output: Registry authority. Verifier: GCP IAM.
Read this stage →Which artifact did the release checks evaluate?
Input: Trusted main revision. Output: Image digest. Verifier: Trivy.
Read this stage →Which workflow endorsed these exact bytes?
Input: Digest and workflow identity. Output: Signature. Verifier: Cosign.
Read this stage →What claims accompany the artifact?
Input: Image and build context. Output: SBOM and provenance. Verifier: Cosign.
Read this stage →Do these statements match this build and source revision?
Input: Digest and statements. Output: Release verification. Verifier: Cosign and jq.
Read this stage →Which verified digest is permitted to run?
Input: Verified digest. Output: Reviewed Git digest pin. Verifier: Reviewer and Argo CD.
Read this stage →Does the requested image meet this namespace and registry policy?
Input: Requested Pod image. Output: Allow or deny. Verifier: Kyverno.
Read this stage →What does an admitted process do next?
Input: Running process events. Output: Detection. Verifier: Falco.
Read this stage →I hardened the verification contract, integrated the admission reader identity, and selected the immutable release digest in Git. These three cases connect the code changes to the evidence and expose their remaining limits. The full engineering account also covers canonical identity and PR validation.
I replaced display-oriented checks with exact signer, digest and parsed provenance assertions that fail when the expected contract is absent.
Read the change and evidenceI gave admission a separate registry reader identity for both the immutable image store and mutable Cosign metadata.
Read the change and evidenceI selected the signed immutable digest in Helm, separating the manual release choice from building and signing the artifact.
Read the change and evidenceInspect all five engineering changes →
The historical capture records the configured digest-pinned workload and a matching trusted request. It establishes this tested path in its recorded environment.
Inspect the accepted request →A matching unsigned request is rejected. Unmatched registries, excluded namespaces and untested subresources remain separate questions.
Inspect the policy scope →Understand the connected system, review the claims against evidence, or prepare an owned reproduction. Each path reuses the detailed handbook instead of replacing it with a simplified overview.
Understand the claim, inspect the contract, then read the evidence.
Follow authority across boundaries and test the limits of each claim.
Start locally, then plan an owned historical environment with explicit rebinding.
Browse the evidence catalogue and all fourteen original screenshots. The captions distinguish code inspection, local checks and recorded execution. A valid signature authenticates an endorsement; it does not establish safe behavior or current cluster health.
Explore related public implementation work. Each project has its own scope and evidence.
Public implementation of Resilience Gate. Inspect its source independently; the GCP captures in this handbook do not validate that project.
Resilience Gate source repository